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1 Introduction
Investors value financial assets not only for their intrinsic value, i.e., their expected dividend or
payment stream, but also for their liquidity: their ability to help agents facilitate transactions.
For instance, U.S Treasuries are often used as collateral in a secured credit market through
repurchase agreements, they are easily sold for cash in secondary asset markets, and, often-
times, they are used directly as means of payment. Accordingly, many liquid financial assets
are priced above their respective fundamental value, and their prices are higher than those of
illiquid assets with comparable safety and maturity characteristics. Also, the liquidity premia
account for a large part of the variation in the liquid asset prices observed in financial markets.
The objective of this paper is to examine the determinants of such liquidity premia. First,
I set up a monetary search model and use it as a guide to my empirical exercise. My model
builds upon Lagos and Wright (2005), but I extend the baseline framework in order to include
a risk-free government bond in addition to fiat money. The government bond is liquid in the
sense that it is useful in the exchange process, which is explicitly incorporated into the model.
Due to its liquidity, its equilibrium price exceeds the fundamental value, and its supply affects
the price (or the yield) through changing the liquidity premium. The ability of the bond to
facilitate trade in a goods market characterized by frictions (such as anonymity and limited
commitment) makes it a substitute for money to some degree, so that money supply, and not
only bond supply, affects the liquidity premium and, consequently, the bond’s price. The key
mechanism that links money supply and the liquidity premium is the opportunity cost of hold-
ing money. An increase in money supply raises the inflation rate and, hence, the cost of holding
money, implying a higher nominal interest rate through the Fisher effect. As a result, agents
substitute the more costly fiat money with the liquid bond, which, in turn, leads to a higher
liquidity premium and, ultimately, a higher bond price. In the extreme case in which the nom-
inal interest rate (on an illiquid bond) is close to zero, and the supply of liquid assets is scarce,
the model predicts the existence of a very high liquidity premium, and a potentially negative
nominal yield on the liquid asset. Hence, my model can help us understand the emergence of
negative yields could in several developed countries, such as Switzerland, the United States,
and Germany, since 2008.
Next, I move on to the empirical exercise that tests the primary results of the theoretical
model. In particular, I test whether money supply is positively correlated with the liquidity
premium on liquid bonds, and whether the latter is negatively correlated with bond supply.
In addition, I examine empirically whether the existence of liquidity premia can be an impor-
tant factor in explaining the aforementioned negative yields on liquid bonds. In my empirical
exercise, I use US Treasuries to capture the liquid bonds introduced in the model. To guaran-
tee robustness of the empirical analysis, I employ various measures of the liquidity premia for
these bonds: the spread of AAA-rated corporate bonds against the long term Treasury bonds,
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the TED spread, and the spreads of AA-rated Commercial Papers and Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) insured Certificates of deposits against Treasury bills.1 The choice of
these financial assets is justified by the fact that they are comparably safe but not as liquid as
Treasury bonds of similar maturities; therefore one can reasonably argue that any spread be-
tween the yield on these assets and Treasury bonds (of similar maturities) reflects differences
in liquidity premia. Next, I use a monetary aggregate, Narrow Money, as a proxy of money be-
cause it only includes components which can be used as a direct medium of exchange implied
by the theory unlike other broader monetary aggregates such as M1 and M2. Furthermore, its
demand is stable against its holding cost, or nominal interest rates in that it displays a down-
ward sloping curve over the sample period as the theory presents later.
The theoretical and empirical analysis can explain the emergence of negative nominal yields.
According to the theory, a reduction in bond supply can drive down its yield into the negative
territory, in situations where the monetary authority is setting a low (slightly above or around
zero) nominal interest rate, as has been the case recently in Switzerland and in the United States.
The empirical exercise confirms that a reduction in the bond supply increases the liquidity pre-
mium, and decreases the yield. In fact, a big drop in the supply of liquid government bonds
was markedly observed in Switzerland during the financial crisis, starting in the last quarter of
2008. It should be pointed out that the existence of negative nominal yields is often considered
anomalous, because it is hard to reconcile through the lens of traditional monetary models.
However, my model of asset liquidity can help rationalize this observation.2
From the theoretic point of view, a large money search literature presents that the liquidity
premium is a primary factor of variation in the prices of liquid financial assets, and that its sup-
ply is negatively correlated with the liquidity premium, whereas money supply is positively.
Similarly, the key mechanism in the literature is the opportunity cost of holding money. As a
pioneer theoretical paper, Geromichalos, Licari, and Suarez-Lledo (2007) set up a Lagos-Wright
type of money search framework with a real asset, and theoretically present that the money
growth rate increases the liquidity premium in the economy where neither money nor assets
are plentiful. They derive this result from the model where assets are a perfect substitute to
money in transactions in a decentralized market, and money supply leads to an increase in the
opportunity cost of holding money. Similarly, several papers with this substitution relationship
between money and financial assets in the literature deliver the more or less similar results. Ex-
amples include Rocheteau and Wright (2005a), Lagos (2010b), Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright
(2012), Jacquet and Tan (2012), Williamson (2012), Carapella andWilliamson (2015), Geromicha-
1I choose the measures which Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) use in their paper for comparison
as well as an additional measure such as the TED spread. Also, the quarterly data are used here, unlike the yearly
data are used in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) to increase the sample size of the measures.
2One of the important lessons we’ve learned from asset liquidity is that it can shed light on existing asset-related
puzzles from a new perspective and provide a liquidity-based theory of asset pricing. Examples include Lagos
(2010a), Geromichalos, Herrenbrueck, and Salyer (2013), Geromichalos and Simonovska (2011), and Jung and Lee
(2015).
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los and Herrenbrueck (2016), Rocheteau, Wright, and Xiao (2016), and Geromichalos, Lee, Lee,
and Oikawa (2016). Also, Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2011) calibrate money search models
to examine how money supply affect capital formation. However, the literature has not tested
empirically its aforementioned results, and not investigated much how liquidity premia cause
the negative yields on liquid assets, either. Of course, it is worth noticing that this type of
money search model is well fitted into the study mentioned above because it can delivers sharp
predictions for the effects of money and bond supply on the liquidity premium. For example,
one time injection of money does not affect the liquidity premium, but its growth does. Hence,
money is neutral but not superneutral. Unlike money, one time injection of bonds has a sub-
stantial impact.3 A model without money, or without explicit exchange processes would not
deliver these results precisely.
To my best knowledge, while the results about the effects of money and bond supply on the
liquidity premium has not been tested empirically yet in the money search literature, there are
a few papers in the finance literature which study the supply effect on the liquidity premium
so as to present that bond supply has a negative impacts on the liquidity premium, or the
convenience yield.4 For example, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) show a strong
negative relationship between the U.S. Treasury supply and its convenience yield. Greenwood,
Hanson, and Stein (2015) show that the T-bill supply has a negative impact on its liquid pre-
mium. Longstaff (2004), Vayanos (2004), Brunnermeier (2009) and Krishnamurthy (2010) inves-
tigate liquidity premia, but focus on the short time period such as financial crises. They all set
up the models without money; therefore, money supply does not affect liquidity premia at all
even if liquid bonds play a role as substitutes with money in reality, and the opportunity cost
of holding money does not work to account for it, either.
Nagel (2014) shows how this substitution relationship between money and liquid bonds af-
fect the liquidity premium through variation in the opportunity cost of holding money, which
is represented by the federal funds rate. The paper shows that federal funds rate is positively
correlated with the liquidity premium. Then, it concludes that bond supply does not have a
‘persistent’ effect on the liquidity premium unlike Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)
and Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2015). However, this result is derived from the fact that
changes in the federal funds rate are involved with changes in supply in the Treasury supply,
because the open market operation by the Federal Reserve is associated with the buying of sell-
ing of the Treasuries in the open market, even though it does not account for all the changes in
the Treasury supply. Also, it does not allow to distinguish the effect of bond supply from that
of money supply, to the effect of changes in money growth from changes in money level, or to
study specific reasons why the negative yields have been observed in the situation where the
3Rocheteau, Wright, and Xiao (2016) argue, for the first time in the literature, that this is why the open market
operations by the fed have effects on the interest rates in the market.
4The convenience yield counts for the premia from both safety and liquidity attributes of a financial assets such
as the U.S. Treasuries.
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nominal interest rate is hovering around zero. Importantly, the money search model I set up
allows me to separate these effects theoretically, and to provide a guidance to analyze why the
negative yields on liquid bonds can emerge in the aforementioned situation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a theoretic model to be tested
in Section 3. In Section 3, I provide a description of the data which are used in the empirical
work and test the results from the theory. In Section 4, I discuss negative yields on liquid bonds
with the theoretical and empirical results from the previous sections. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Physical Environment
Time is discrete and continues forever. There is a discount factor between periods β ∈ (0, 1).
Each period is divided into two sub-periods. A decentralized market (henceforce DM) with
frictions opens in the second sub-period, and a perfectly competitive or centralized market
(henceforth CM) follows. The frictions are characterized by anonymity among agents and bi-
lateral bargaining trade. As a result, unsecured credit is not allowed in transactions, and ex-
change must be quid pro quo or needs secured credit. There are two divisible and nonstorable
consumption goods: goods produced and consumed in the CM (henceforth CM goods) and spe-
cial goods in the DM (henceforth DM goods). There are two types of agents; buyers and sellers,
whose measures are normalized to the unit, respectively. They live forever. Their identities
are determined by the roles which they play in the DM and permanent. While sellers produce,
sell and do not consume DM goods, buyers consume and do not produce. Their preferences in
period t are given by
Buyers : U(xt, ht, qt) =u(qt) + U(xt)− ht
Sellers : V(xt, ht, qt) =− c(qt) + U(xt)− ht
where xt is consumption of CM goods, qt consumption of DM goods, ht hours worked to pro-
duce CM goods, and c(qt) a cost of production of qt. As usual, U and u are twice continuously
differentiable with with U ′ > 0, u′ > 0, U ′′ < 0, u′′ < 0, u(0) = 0, u′(0) = ∞, u′(∞) = 0. Also, I
assume that c(qt) = qt. Let q
∗ ≡ {q : u′(q) = 1}, i.e., it denotes the optimal consumption level in
the DM. Also, assume that there exists x∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that U ′(x∗) = 1 and U(x∗) > x∗.
There are two types of assets; fiat money and a 1-period real government bond. They are
perfectly divisible and storable. Agents can purchase any amount of money and government
bonds at the ongoing price φt and ψt in the CM, respectively. Money grows at the rate of µ:
Mt+1 = (1+µ)Mt. I assume that µ > β−1, but also consider the limit case where µ→ β−1, i.e.,
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the case where the money growth rate approaches closely the Friedman rule. If µ is positive, it
implies that newmoney is injected, but if µ negative, withdrawn through lump-sump transfers
to buyers in the CM. A government bond issued in period t delivers one unit of CM good in
period t+1, and its supply in period t isAt. Since we focus on stationarity equilibria, At is fixed
at A. The government (a consolidate authority) budget constraint is
Gt + Tt − φtµMt + A(1− ψt) = 0,
where Gt is government expenditure, Tt is a lump-sum transfer or tax, φtµMt is seigniorage of
new money injection, and A(1− ψt) is government debt service.
Now, I describe more details about activities which occur in each sub-period. First, I start
with the description of the second sub-period, where a CM opens. Both buyers and sellers
consume and produce a CM good. They work or use their assets, money (m) and government
bonds (a), which they are holding from the previous period in order to consume, so as to pay
back the credit made in the previous period and to adjust their portfolios which they will bring
to the next DM. They have access to technology that turns one unit of labor into one unit of
general goods. Also, they trade money, and bonds among all agents to re-balance their portfolio
they will bring to the next period.
Next, a DM opens in the first sub-period. All of the buyers are matched with a seller in
a bilateral fashion and vice versa. Buyers make a take-it–or-leave-it (henceforth TIOLI) offer
to a seller to determine the terms of trade.5 Since buyers are anonymous and have limited
commitment, a medium of exchange (henceforth MOE) is required in their transactions. Both
money and government bonds can serve as media of exchange. Specifically, the DM is divided
into two sub-markets, DM1 and DM2, depending on what type of medium of exchange can be
used. In the DM1, sellers accept only a direct medium of exchange. Both assets are used as a
direct medium of exchange, but, unlike money, only a fraction g ∈ (0, 1) of bonds can serve as
a direct medium of exchange. g is an illiquidity parameter of government bonds, and reflects
the fact that the government bonds are not as liquid as money as a direct medium of exchange.
Intuitively speaking, it can take time and cost in playing a role as money do in exchange in the
DM1. On the other hand, in the DM2, sellers accpet only collateralized credit (or loans), i.e.,
secured credit as a MOE, and bonds are used as collateral for credit. The credit is repaid back
in CM goods in the forthcoming CM. Also, a portion h ∈ (0, 1) of bonds can only be used as
collateral; therefore, buyers always have incentives to pay back their credits. This is so-called
the Loan to Value (henceforth LTV) ratio, and also is related to the haircut since it is defined by
1 minus the LTV, following the standard approach in finance. The model will focus on cases of
5I could assume that they negotiate the terms of trade through a Kalai bargaining protocol, where the buyers’
bargaining power is less than one. However, since the bargaining protocol is not critical to derive most of interest-
ing results of the paper, I use the simplest setup here by assuming that buyers make a TIOLI offer to their trading
partnert.
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incentive compatible contracts. All buyers and sellers visit DM1 andDM2 with probabilities θ
and 1− θ, respectively. Figure 1 summarizes the events within each period.
Figure 1: Market Timing
2.2 Value Functions
First, I describe the value function of a representative buyer who enters the CM with money
(m), bonds (a) and the collateralized credit (ℓ) made last period, since it is the buyer that makes
primary decisions for interesting results from the model. The value function of the buyer is
WB(wt, ℓt) = max
xt,ht,wt+1
{
U(xt)− ht + βE
[
V B(wt+1)
]}
(1)
s.t. xt + φ
′
twt+1 = ht + φtwt − ℓt + T
where wt = (mt, at), φ
′
t = (φt, ψt), and φt = (φt, 1). ℓt stands for the collateralized loan which is
made last sub-period, and so must be paid back in the form of general goods. Tt is a lump-sum
transfer to the buyer. V B represents the buyer’s value function in the next period DM. It can
be easily verified that xt = x
∗ at the optimum. Substituting ht in the budget constraint into the
value functionWB yields
WB(wt, ℓt) = φtwt − ℓt + Λ
B
t (2)
where ΛBt ≡ U(x
∗)−x∗+Tt+maxxt,wt+1{−φ
′
twt+1+βE
[
V B(wt+1)
]
}. Notice that the value func-
tion in the CM is linear in the choice variables due to the quasi-linearity of U , as in the standard
models which are based on Lagos and Wright (2005). Consequently, the optimal choices of the
buyer do not depend on the current state variables.
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Next, consider a representative seller with money, bonds, and the collateralized loan who
enters the CM. The loan is paid back by the counterpart buyer who she met in the previous DM.
W S(wt, ℓt) = max
xt,ht
{
U(xt)− ht + βE
[
V S(0)
]}
s.t. xt = ht + φtwt + ℓt
where V S denotes the seller’s value function in the DM. Notice that wt+1 = 0 for the seller.
Since the seller does not consume any good in the DM, there is no incentive to bring money
and bonds to the next period DM, when the money holding cost is strictly positive due to
µt > β − 1.
6 It is also easily verified that xt = x
∗ at the optimum as in the case of the buyer.
Replacing ht into the value function yields
W S(wt, ℓt) = φtwt + ℓt + Λ
S
t (3)
where ΛSt ≡ U(x
∗)− x∗ + βE[V S(0)].
Next, the DM opens. Buyers visit the DM1 with the probability θ and the DM2 with the
probability 1 − θ. Also, all agents match in each DM. Hence, the expected value function of a
buyer with portfolio wt in the DM is given by
V B(wt) = θ
[
u(q1t ) +W
B(wt − pt, 0)
]
+ (1− θ)
[
u(q2t ) +W
B(wt, ℓt)
]
(4)
where pt = (p
m
t , p
a
t ) is a portfolio exchanged for DM goods in a meeting with a seller in the
DM1, and ℓt is the collateralized loan made in the DM2. q
1
t (q
2
t ) represents the quantity that are
traded in the DM1 (DM2). The terms of trades in each market are determined by bargaining in
pairwise meetings which Section 2.3 describes.
The value function of a seller is similar except for the fact that the seller does not bring any
money and bonds to the DM for transactions.
V S(0) = θ
[
−q1t +W
S(pt, 0)
]
+ (1− θ)
[
−q2t +W
S(0, ℓt)
]
2.3 Bargaining Problems in the DM
There are two sub-markets in the DM: DM1 and DM2, depending on what type of means of
payment can be used in transactions. First, consider a meeting in the DM1 where a buyer with
portfoliowt meets with a seller. Sellers accept both money and bonds as a medium of exchange.
However, a fraction g of bonds can only be accepted. The terms of trade is determined by
the proportional bargaining over the quantity of DM goods, and a total payment of money
6See Rocheteau and Wright (2005b) for the precise and careful proof.
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and bonds exchanged between them. A buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a seller to
maximize her surplus under the seller’s participation constraint and her budget constraint.
Then, the bargaining problem is expressed by
max
q1
t
,p
t
{
u(q1t ) +W
B(wt − pt, 0)−W
B(wt, 0)
}
(5)
s.t.− q1t +W
S(pt, 0)−W
S(0, 0) = 0,
and the effective budget constraint pt ≤ w˜t, and w˜t = (mt, g · at). Notice that, since bonds are
not as liquid as money in the DM1, the effective budget is less than the total budget. Only a
fraction g ∈ (0, 1) of bonds can be used as a MOE here. Of course, I will consider an extreme
case where g → 1 later to discuss how negative interest yields emerge. Substituting (2) and (3)
into (5) simplifies the above problem as follows.
max
q1
t
,p
t
{
u(q1t )− φtpt
}
(6)
s.t.− q1t + φtpt = 0,
and pt ≤ w˜t, and w˜t = (mt, g · at). The following lemma summarizes the terms of trade which
are determined by the solutions to bargaining problem.
Lemma 1. The real balances of a representative buyer are denoted as z(wt) ≡ φtwt. Define q
∗ = {q :
u′(qt) = 1}, and z
∗ as the real balances of the portfolio (mt, at) such that φtmt + gat = q
∗. Also, p∗ is
the pairs of (mt, at) in z
∗. Then, the terms of trade are given by
q1t (wt) =

q
∗, if z(w) ≥ z∗,
z(w˜t), if z(wt) < z
∗.
pt(wt) =

p
∗, if z(wt) ≥ z
∗,
wt, if z(wt) < z
∗.
(7)
Proof. See the appendix
Similarly, in the DM2, a buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a seller as in the DM1.
However, she maximize her surplus subject to a different constraint, which is the credit limit
constraint, unlike the effective budget constraint in DM1. Then, the bargaining problem is
described as follows.
max
q2
t
,ℓt
{
u(q2t ) +W
B(wt, ℓt)−W
B(wt, 0)
}
(8)
s.t.− q2t +W
S(0, ℓt)−W
S(0, 0) = 0,
and the credit limit constraint ℓt ≤ hat. Substituting (2) and (3) into (8) yields the following
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expression.
max
q2
t
,ℓt
{
u(q2t )− ℓt
}
(9)
−q2t + ℓt = 0, (10)
and ℓt ≤ hat. The solution to the bargaining problem is described by the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Define the total real value of a buyer’s bond holdings as za(wt) ≡ hat. Also, define z
a∗ ≡ q∗.
The terms of trade are given by
q2t (wt) =

q
∗, if za(wt) ≥ z
a∗,
za(wt), if z
a(wt) < z
a∗,
ℓ(w) =

z
a∗, if za(wt) ≥ z
a∗,
za(wt), if z
a(wt) < z
a∗.
(11)
Proof. See the appendix
Since buyers make a TIOLI offer, i.e., they take all the bargaining power, the solution is
straightforward. The main variables to determine the level of DM goods produced are the real
balances, or the bond holdings of buyers in each transaction. For example, if the real balances
are enough to get the optimal consumption level q∗, i.e., if z(wt) ≥ z
∗, then the optimal q∗ level
will be exchanged with the corresponding payment, z∗, which can be less than z(wt). On the
other hand, if the real balances are not enough in the same sense, then the buyers will hand
over all of their real balances to sellers to purchase as many DM goods as possible. The sellers
will produce the quantity that her participation constraint implies. The similar interpretation
can be applied to the DM2.
2.4 Buyers’ Optimal Choices
Now, I describe the objective function which a buyer maximizes by choosing money and bonds
(mt+1, at+1) in the DM. Substituting (4) into the inside of the maximization operator in (1) and
using linearity of the value functions yield the following objective function J .
J = −φ′twt+1 + β
{
θ
[
u(q1t+1) + φt+1(wt+1 − pt+1)
]
+ (1− θ)
[
u(q2t+1) + φt+1wt+1 − ℓt+1
]}
(12)
The first term stands for the cost of choosingmoney (mt+1) and bonds (mt+1) which buyers bring
to the forthcoming DM. The terms in the curly bracket present the benefits they can obtain from
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transactions in the DM subject to their portfolios. Then, the Euler equations are given by
φt = β
[
(1− θ) + θu′
(
min{φt+1w˜t+1, q
∗})
)]
φt+1, (13)
ψt = β
{
θ
[
(1− g) + gu′
(
min{φt+1w˜t+1, q
∗}
) ]
+ (1− θ)
[
(1− h) + hu′ (min{hat+1, q
∗})
]}
, (14)
The left-hand side on each Euler equation presents the marginal cost of buying a unit of
money or government bond. It is equal to its price to be paid when a buyer purchase it in the
CM. On the other hand, the right-hand side is the marginal benefit from holding it in the DM.
Buyers can use them as a medium of exchange to purchase DM goods produced by sellers. If
they are used in the DM, i.e., if u′ is zero on the right-hand side, its price should be equal to its
fundamental value, βφt+1 or β, respectively.
Figure 2 presents the continuous and decreasing money demand against the cost of holding
money captured by φt/(φt+1β), which comes from equation (13). Similarly, inserting equation
(13) into (14) shows the inverse bond demand curve against its price. Their inverse relationship
makes sense because the bond price implies the cost of holding the bonds, given the fixed
dividend in the forthcoming CM. Also, the bond demand curve depends on the cost of holding
money. It is easily found that the curve shifts out (in) as the money holding cost increases
(decreases) as in Figure 3. This relationship is intuitively straightforward to understand. If
the money holding cost increases, agents become less willing to hold money, i.e., the money
demand will decrease. However, since the government bonds can also play a role in relaxing
the liquidity constraint in the DM to some extent as money does, even if not perfectly, the
demand on the government bonds will increase. Notice that both demand curves are flat in the
regions where m > m∗ and hat > q
∗, respectively. This is because one extra unit of money or
government bond is not useful in the DM transactions any more. In these territories, buyers
already hold money or bonds enough to purchase q∗.
2.5 Equilibrium and Characterization
I focus on stationarity equilibria, in which both real money and bond balances are constant over
time. It implies that φtMt = φt+1Mt+1 and At = A. Then, the money growth rate is equal to the
inflation rate in the CM, i.e., 1 + µ = φt/φt+1 = 1 + π.
Definition 1. A steady state equilibrium is a list of real balances of buyers, z˜t = φtMt + gA, and
bond holdings z˜a = hA, money and bond prices φ′t, bilateral terms of trade in DM1: q(wt) and
p(wt)which are given by Lemma 1, and bilateral terms of trade inDM2: q(wt) and ℓ(wt)which
are given by Lemma 2 such that:
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Figure 2: Money Demand
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Figure 3: Asset Demand
(i) the decision rule of a representative buyer solves the individual optimization problem (1),
taking prices φ′t and φt/φt+1 = 1 + µ as given;
(ii) the terms of trade in the DM satisfy (7) and (11);
(iii) prices are such that the CM clears, i.e.,wt+1 = [µMt, A] for buyers.
Then, the following lemma summarizes the equilibrium objects.
Lemma 3. There exists a unique steady state equilibrium with four different cases.
(i) If z˜t ≥ z
∗ and z˜a ≥ z∗, then, q1t = q
2
t = q
∗, φt = (z
∗ − gA)/Mt, and ψt = β;
(ii) If z˜t ≥ z
∗ and z˜a < z∗, then, q1t = q
∗, q2t = z˜
a
t , φt = (z
∗ − gA)/Mt, and ψt = β{θ+ (1− θ)
[
(1−
h) + hu′(q2t )
]
};
(iii) If z˜t < z
∗ and z˜a ≥ z∗, then, q1t = z˜t, q
2
t = q
∗, φt = (q
1
t − gA)/Mt, and ψt = β
{
θ
[
(1 − g) +
gu′ (q1t )
]
+ (1− θ)
}
;
(iv) If z˜t < z
∗ and z˜a < z∗, then, q1t = z˜t, q
2
t = z˜
a
t , φt = (q
1
t − gA)/Mt, and ψt = β
{
θ
[
(1 − g) +
gu′ (q1t )
]
+ (1− θ)
[
(1− h) + hu′ (q2t )
]}
.
Proof. See the appendix.
It is straightforward to understand the definition of equilibrium. The fact that the real
money balances and the bond supply are constant over time in the steady state implies that
both z˜t and z˜
a are constant. Then, given the market clearing condition, z˜t and z˜
a determine the
quantities and real money and bond balances exchanged in the DM, following Lemma 1 and 2.
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Now, the Euler equations, (13) and (14), for the optimal money and bond holdings with the
above definition can be reexpressed as follows.
φt = β
{
1 + θ [u′ (min{z˜t+1, q
∗})− 1]
}
φt+1 (15)
ψt = β
{
1 + θ · g [u′ (min{z˜t+1, q
∗})− 1] + (1− θ)h [u′ (min{z˜a, q∗})− 1]
}
(16)
In order to examine how the equilibrium bond price responds to changes in money and
bond supply, let’s plug (15) into (16), then the price is as follows.
ψ = β
{
1 + g(
1 + µ
β
− 1) + (1− θ)h [u′ (z˜a)− 1]
}
(17)
= β
{
1 + gi+ (1− θ)h [u′ (z˜a)− 1]
}
(18)
where i ≡ (1 + µ)/β − 1. There are several interesting points to notice here. First of all, the last
equation is obtained by the Fisher equation, because µ = π in the stationary equilibrium and
1/β = 1+rwhen r stands for the yield on a real bond which is not useful in the DM exchange in
the sense that it is not accepted by sellers. Hence, i represents a nominal interest rate of a totally
illiquid real bond. Its real price (β), which is the inverse of the real interest rate 1/β, is exactly
equal to asset prices which are derived in the traditional asset pricing models where assets are
only used as a store of value: the asset prices equal the present discount value of their future
stream of consumption dividends. Second, the price of a liquid bond (ψ) is always higher than
that of a illiquid bond (β) when the asset supply is not high enough in the sense that hA < q∗,
i.e., u′(z˜a) > 1. In other words, the rate of return on a liquid bond (ρ) is lower than that on an
illiquid (i).7 Hence, the difference between them can be used to measure the market price of
the liquidity service that the liquid bond provides, i.e., the liquidity premium. Lastly, the zero
net nominal interest rate (i = 0) implies that the money growth equals the Friedman rule, i.e.,
µ = β − 1.
More importantly, the equations, (17) and (18), present that not only bond supply but also
money supply determine the equilibrium bond price together with the bond demand when
0 < g < 1, i.e., when they are substitutes to some extent in the sense that bonds help to relax
the liquidity constraint in the DM1. This implies that the demands on money and bonds are
interconnected because both of them are useful in exchange process, to a greater and lesser ex-
tent, as in the papers in the money search literature such as Geromichalos, Licari, and Suarez-
Lledo (2007) in which money and real assets are perfect substitutes, and Lester, Postlewaite,
and Wright (2012) in which the illiquid parameter g is endogenized. In this case, the price of
the illiquid bond is fixed at β over time, whereas the price of the liquid bond is affected by both
7To distinguish nominal yields between an illiquid bond and an liquid bond, let ρ denote the latter.
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money and bond supply. Hence, the price variation of the liquid bond is equal to the variation
of the liquidity premium, and the two words can be used interchangeably here when the bond
price exceed the fundamental value.
Next, consider that not all µ ∈ (β−1,∞) are consistent with a monetary equilibrium. In fact,
amonetary equilibrium is supported for the range of (β−1, µ¯), where µ¯ ≡ {µ : µ = β [1 + θ [u′(z˜a)− 1]]}.
If we allow for the case where µ = β − 1, it implies z˜ ≥ q∗, and so will be the lower bound for
a monetary equilibrium. In this case, the marginal change in money supply never affect the
liquidity premium of a liquid bond. On the other hand, the upper bound µ¯ decreases in bond
supply A. It implies that agents are less patient with high inflation, so that less willing to hold
money given the supply of money, as the supply of bond increases.
The following proposition describes how the real equilibrium bond price, or the liquidity
premium, is associated with money and bond supply. As mentioned in the introduction, we
focus on the monetary equilibria, where µ ∈ (β − 1, µ¯).
Proposition 1. The real bond price exceeds the fundamental value, i.e, ψ > β, and is increasing in µ.
Also,
(i) if z˜a ≥ q∗, ψ = ψ(µ), i.e., the bond price is only affected by the money supply.
(ii) if z˜a < q∗, ψ = ψ(µ,A), i.e., the bond price is affected by both money and bond supply. In addition,
it is decreasing in A, i.e., ψ′(A) < 0.
The proof is straightforward. Notice in Proposition 1 that µ is also replaced with i because
they are linear by the definition as in equation (18). The real bond price exceeds its fundamen-
tal value because a liquid bond plays a role in facilitating transactions in the DM; otherwise
would not occur. Hence, the liquid bond bears a liquidity premium. If z˜a > q∗, i.e., the bond
supply is plentiful in that it allows agents to purchase the optimal quantity, q∗, in the DM2. The
marginal increase in the bond supply does not allow buyers to purchase additional goods in
the DM anymore. In other words, changing the bond supply does not affect transactions in the
DM2; therefore it does not affect the liquidity premium. However, money supply changes the
liquidity premium. For example, increasing µ raises up the opportunity cost of holding money,
so that it increases the demand on bonds and lowers the rate of return on bonds. On the other
hand, if z˜a < q∗, i.e., the bond supply is scarce, not only money supply but also bond supply
affect the liquidity premium. This is because the marginal change in the bond supply has an
impact on relaxing the liquidity constraint in the DM exchange.
Next, consider now some extreme cases where money and bonds are perfect substitutes or
not substitutes at all so as to understand intuitively how the parameters, g and 1− θ, can affect
bond prices, or the liquidity premium. Moreover, I will empirically test which case is well sup-
ported by the U.S. data in Section 3. As mentioned in subsection 2.1, g is an illiquid parameter,
implying how liquid bonds are, comparing with money in DM transactions. This parameter
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can be interpreted as a parameter of how well developed or how liquid a secondary asset mar-
ket is, where bonds are exchanged for money. Less friction in the secondary market implies
higher g because less friction means that bonds are more easily converted to money, vice versa.
For example, if there are more investors or buyers for bonds due to the developed institution,
including high-quality trading platform technology, in the secondary market, assets are more
likely to be liquidated easily, and so to provide liquidity services easily. On the other hand, the
parameter 1− θ can be interpreted as how well the collateralized credit market functions when
money is scarce. More collateralized transactions in the financial market implies higher 1− θ.
Now, consider the four cases as follows, depending on the different combinations of g and
θ (or 1-θ). All the results are delivered by equations (17) and (18).
(Case 1: Perfectly illiquid bonds) Bonds are totally illiquid in the sense that they are useless
in the DM exchange, i.e., g → 0 and θ → 1. This is the case where the bonds only function
as a store of value. Hence, the real bond price ψ is equal to the fundamental value, β, i.e., the
present value of the dividend that the bonds deliver next period, and so they do not carry the
liquidity premium at all. As a result, it is not affected by money and bond supply at all.
(Case 2: Perfect substitutes to money) Bonds are perfect substitutes to money, i.e., g → 1 and
θ → 1. The bond prices are equal to 1 + µ. Then its nominal yield ρ is give by
1 + ρ = (1 + π)
1
ψ
= φt/φt+1 × φt+1/φt = 1. (19)
The gross nominal interest rate (1 + ρ) equals 1 and the net nominal interest rate equals zero
all the times. In this case, since the bonds are identical with money in terms of ability of facil-
itating transactions in the DM and also deliver dividends, their real prices are higher than the
fundamental value β. Moreover, an increase (a decrease) in money supply raises (lowers) the
real prices, or the liquidity premia.
(Case 3: Liquid bonds but not substitutes to money) Bonds are liquid in the DM, but not substi-
tutes to money at all, i.e., g → 0 and 0 < θ < 1. This is the case where the bonds are perfectly
illiquid in the DM1, and so the two decentralized markets are totally separated. Hence, the
supply of each does not affect each other, so that the liquidity premia which the bonds carry is
only affected by their supply, not by money supply.
(Case 4: Liquid bonds and perfect substitutes) Bonds are liquid in the DM2 and also perfect
substitutes to money in the DM1, i.e., g → 1 and 0 < θ < 1. They hold extra values in exchange
process. Then, equation (17) yield the net nominal interest rate as follows.
ρ =
−β(1− θ)h [u′(hA))− 1)]
(1 + µ) + β(1− θ)h [u′(hA))− 1)]
(20)
=
(1− θ)h [u′(hA))− 1)]
i+ (1− θ)h [u′(hA))− 1)]
< 0 (21)
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In this case, the numerator is always negative only if u′(hA) > 1, i.e., only if bond supply is
scarce. Also, the liquidity premium is affected by both money and asset supply. The nomi-
nal rate of return on a liquid bond is negative, irrespective of money and bond supply, or the
nominal rate of return on a illiquid bond i. It implies that lenders are willing to pay interests
even though they lend money, because the bonds provide extra liquidity services in transac-
tions. I will discuss more details about under what conditions negative interest rates emerge in
a generic case, unlike this extreme case, in Section 4.
3 Data and Empirical Results
The theory in the previous section predicts that the real price of a liquid bond, or the liquidity
premium is affected by both money and bond supply in a general case where 0 < g, θ < 1,
whereas that of an illiquid bond is unaffected, as summarized in Proposition 1. In this section,
I test the predictions of the theory here with the U.S. data: whether the liquidity premium is
positively associated with the rate of money supply, but negatively with bond supply in reality.
Basically, equations (22) and (23) are used as a guide for the empirical analysis.
3.1 Data
First of all, it is important to discuss how to measure all of the variables mentioned in the theory
such as the liquidity premium, money supply (or, the nominal interest rate of an illiquid bond),
and bond supply from the data before we move on to the empirical results. As well known,
the real rates of return are not observed in reality. Also, there exist various types of monetary
aggregates, such as Monetary Base, Narrow Money, M1, and M2, which we can use to measure
money supply, and several types of government bonds are traded in the financial market.
First, I describe how to measure the liquidity premium. As the theory presents in the pre-
vious section, a change in the real yield on a liquid bond is equal to a change in the liquidity
premiumwhich the bond carries, only if the bond is default-free, except for some extreme cases.
The problem is that neither the real yield nor the liquidity premium is observable as an index.
Only the nominal yield is observable. For this reason, I use the yield spread between a liquid
bond and an illiquid bond as a proxy of the liquidity premium as in the relevant literature.
This measure is not only measurable, but also consistent with the theory. The theory presents
the nominal yield of an illiquid real bond, a liquid real bond, and the spread between them as
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follows.
1 + i = (1 + π)(1 + r) = (1 + π)
1
β
1 + ρ = (1 + π)
1
ψ
s = i− ρ ≈ ψ − β =
[
1 + g(
1 + µ
β
− 1)
]
+ (1− θ)h [u′ (z˜a)− 1] (22)
= 1 + gi+ (1− θ)h [u′ (z˜a)− 1] , (23)
where r stands for the real yield on an illiquid bond, and ρ on a liquid bond. As we used in
deriving equation (17), the first two equations present the nominal yields of an illiquid bond
and a liquid bond by the Fisher equation. Then, subtracting the latter from the former delivers
the approximate yield spread between them, which is given by equations (22) and (23). This
subtraction eliminates the effect of the inflation on the nominal yields of both bonds at the
same time and, therefore, isolates the liquidity premium alone from other components such as
the risk premium and the term premium in bond prices in the case where both bonds have the
same maturity and default risk. As a result, this spread can be used as a measure of the liquid-
ity premium meant in the theory. Also, it is important that it can be easily computable as the
yield spread of two different bonds in terms of liquidity. Of course, it should be emphasized
that they should have same or, at least, similar maturities and default risks.
Then, what should liquid and illiquid bonds be in reality? First, when it comes to a liquid
bond, we define a liquid bond in the model as a bond which is useful in exchange process.
In reality, it implies that the liquid bond should be easy to be sold for cash in the secondary
market, to be accepted directly as a medium of exchange, or to be used for credit (or loans) in
the credit market such as the Repurchase Agreement market (or REPO in short) and the federal
funds market. Moreover, it should be safe in the sense that it is sure to deliver its dividend at
maturity, i.e., there is no probability to default until maturity. For this reason, here, I use the
yields of all types of Treasuries such as Treasury bonds, notes and bills, as the nominal yields
of the liquid bond meant by the model.
On the other hand, an illiquid bond in the model implies a bond which can not be used in
exchange, and its holder should keep it in his hand until maturity for cash unless he accepts a
huge discount for the secondary trade. Hence, it is inferior to the liquid bond only in terms of
being liquidating. Of course, they should be exactly or, at least, similarly as safe as the liquid
bond to avoid the case where their yield difference includes the risk premium. In the case where
there is only a small difference in terms of the default risk, it can be controlled in regressions
by adding variables to explain it. Similarly, the maturities should be the same for both bonds.
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8 Taking all of these into account, I use the yields of Aaa-rated corporate bonds, 3-month Com-
mercial Papers, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured Certificates of deposits
(henceforth FDIC CDs) as measures of the yields of illiquid bonds. All of these are available in
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)9. I will match each of those yields with Treasuries
with consideration for maturity in order to compute the liquidity premium on each maturity.
Lastly, I also use the TED spread as a measure of the liquidity premium on three-month
Treasury bills, which is the difference between three-month LIBOR based on US dollars and
three-month Treasury bill. It is true that 3-month LIBOR based on US dollars bears the risk
premium, because the contracts between banks are not default free. However, it is also true
that it is small, and so it can be controlled and absorbed by a variable to represent default risk
in the regression.
Next, consider which of monetary aggregates should be used to measure money supply
in the data. As mentioned above, there are several monetary aggregates which are complied
by the Fed: Monetary Base, Narrow Money, M1, M2, and M3. There are two criteria to think
about which one among them is appropriate. First, what the theory regards as money is per-
fectly liquid in exchange process, or it is a perfect medium of exchange, comparing to bonds.
Hence, the monetary aggregate meant by the theory should not include any type of illiquid
financial assets such as savings deposits including money market deposit accounts and small-
denomination time deposits, which is precisely time deposits in amounts of less than $100,000.10
Then, this criterion excludes M2, and also broader monetary aggregates such as M3. Secondly,
its demand against the opportunity cost of holding it, represented by the nominal interest rate
(or the inflation rate), should be stable. If it is not, the mechanism through which the theory
works can not be applied to explain the relationship between money supply and the liquidity
premium. Specifically, it should be true that, when the opportunity cost of holding money rises
up, the demand declines. Otherwise, it will never lead to an increase in the demand on liquid
bonds as a substitute to money, and neither does the liquidity premium the bonds bear in the
end. However, the demand on M1 against the nominal interest rate has not been stable, so that
M1 is excluded in the regressions shown later.11
Based on the aforementioned criteria, I use Narrow Money as a measure of money. Narrow
Money is well suited to the theory in the sense that it is absolutely used as a medium of ex-
8In reality, since there exist secondary trade markets for almost all of bonds only if sellers of bonds accept more
or less, or even considerable losses, there would not exist a perfectly illiquid bond. In other words, it is hard to
find totally illiquid bonds, even if they are almost as safe as Treasuries and have the same or similar maturities.
However, it can not be denied that the yield spread reflects the liquidity premium, even if we consider it.
9I updated the yields of Aaa-rated corporate bonds and 3-month Commercial Papers in their dataset by using
the data FRED Economic Data (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/) provides because some values are revised.
10Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/current/default.htm
11See Lucas Jr. and Nicolini (2015) for details about the stability of M1. The paper investigate why monetary
aggregates become unstable over time.
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change in transactions.12 Also, it presents a stable demand curve over the sample period, i.e., a
unambiguously negative relationship with the nominal interest rate over the period from 1946
to 2008. In addition, notice that I use the Federal Funds rate as a proxy of the nominal interest
rate on illiquid financial bonds. I could use other interest rates such as 3 month commercial
paper rate, but they deliver the same relationship because they show the strong co-movement
historically. Figure 4 displays the ratio of Narrow Money to nominal GDP against its hold-
ing cost (i), which implies L = M/PY in order to look at the real demand on money or real
money balances proportional to Y implied by equation 15. In the case where bond supply is not
plentiful, it can be re-expressed to present the money demand as follows.
φt
φt+1β
= 1 + θ [u′(z˜)− 1]
⇔ 1 + i = 1 + θ [u′(z˜)− 1] ,
where φt
φt+1β
= 1+ i.13 Obviously, the graph on the left panel presents that the real balances z˜, or
money demand mˆ is negatively associated with the nominal interest rate of an illiquid bond, or
the opportunity cost of holding money.
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Figure 5: Bond Demand
Also, notice that money growth rate has a one to one relationship with the nominal yield
of an illiquid bond in the stationary equilibrium, which is implied by the Fisher equation, i.e.,
1+ i = (1+π)(1+r) = (1+µ)/β, as seen in Equations (22) and (23). They theoretically stand for
the same economic notion: the opportunity cost of holding money. The theory does not distin-
guish between them. The empirical result can show which variable is more suitable to explain
changes in the liquidity premium. The nominal interest rate as an index of the opportunity cost
12NarrowMoney includes nonbank public currency used as a medium of exchange, deposits held at Federal Re-
serves Banks, and reserve adjustment magnitude, which is“adjustments made to the monetary base due to changes
in the statutory reserve requirements”. See http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/03/09/0309ra.xls
for more details.
13Since z˜t = z˜t+1 in stationary equilibria, the time subscript is omitted.
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of money holding has a positive impact on the liquidity premium through the samemechanism
in which money growth works. In reality, there are a variety of interest rates in the financial
market, and it is also difficult to find the yields of totally illiquid bonds. However, as well
known, they have the strong co-movement relationship among them. Here, I use the Federal
Funds rate as a proxy of the nominal interest rate which the model presents. The Federal Funds
rate can reflect the money holding cost better than any other, because it is highly correlated
with other short term interest rates which agents in an economy can consider as substitutes for
cash, even if it is not perfectly substitutes. Moreover, since it is the policy interest rate which
the Fed has been using, it is comparable to money supply as a policy variable.
When it comes to bond supply, I use the ratio of the outstanding stock of the public debt
to the nominal GDP for the liquid bond supply meant by the theory, as in Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2012). The ratio of debt to GDP is measured as the market value of the pub-
lic debt at the end of a fiscal year divided by the GDP of the same year.14 Using the same data
as in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) and Nagel (2014) allows for comparison of
my empirical results with the results in the literature.
Last but not least, Figure 5 looks at the bond demand against the yield spread between the
Aaa-rated corporate bond and the long term Treasury bond. Notice that, as Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) points out, it is the bond demand for not only liquidity but also safety,
but it is mainly driven by the demand for the liquidity services Treasuries provide. It had been
stable up until 2008 in the sense that it is an unambiguous downward sloping curve. However,
after 2009, the demand seems to shift out after the recent financial crisis. This is similar to the
money demand. For this reason, I only use the data over the period from 1945 up to 2008.
3.2 Empirical Results
Now, I describe the details about the empirical test for the theoretical predictions. As men-
tioned in the previous section, I first compute several different yield spreads between them and
Treasuries, depending on maturities: the yield spreads between Aaa-rated corporate bonds and
the long term Treasuries, between Aa-rated commercial papers and 3-month Treasury bills, and
between 6-month FDIC insured Certificates of Deposit (henceforth CD) and 6-month Treasury
bills, which are short-term bonds because their maturities are shorter than one year.15 Each of
the spreads stands for the liquidity premium which each of different maturities of Treasuries
bears. In other words, all of those spreads reflect the market values for the liquidity services
the Treasuries provide, but different in the sense that the former is the liquidity premium on
14See Henning Bohn’s website for more details: http://econ.ucsb.edu/ bohn/data.html
15I use the spreads which are used in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) but slightly different because
they are updated from the original source.
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the long term Treasuries and the latter on the short term Treasuries.16
Next, it is important that I use the growth rate of Narrow Money for money supply in the
regressions. As seen in Equation (15), what affects liquidity premia is the growth rate of money
supply, not the absolute level of money supply. The theory predicts that one-time change in
money supply does not affect the liquidity premia and other real variables such as real bal-
ances, quantities traded in the DM, but its growth rate does. The theory delivers that money
supply is not super-neutral but neutral. A one-time injection or withdraw of money to an econ-
omy is ineffective because its relative price is adjusted to keep the real variables unchanged.
On the other hand, I use the level of the debt to the nominal GDP ratio for bond supply in the
regressions, because it is not neutral unlike money. Even one-time change in the case of bond
supply affects the real variables.
Also, in order to control the risk premium, associated with default risks, which can be in-
cluded in the yield spreads, a stock market volatility index is used as a default control variable
which is used in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012).17 Including this measure in
the regressions makes sure that changes in the yield spreads are driven mainly by changes in
the liquidity premia, given the low default rate on Aaa-rated corporate bonds and Aa-rated
Commercial Papers.18 However, unlike these two securities, FDIC insured CDs are as safe as
Treasuries, given FDIC insurance, so that its spread against the same maturities of Treasuries
can be used as a good proxy of the liquidity premium.
Before the regressions, I graphically look at how money growth rate had evolved with the
different measures of the liquidity premium over the sample period from Figures 6 and 7, and
it is consistent with the predictions from the theory. The figures show that the movement of
money growth is almost positively related to the liquidity premium, and their variations are
also similar in terms of frequency and width.
Now, let’s move onto the empirical results from the regressions. Table 1 presents the impacts
of money growth, bond supply, and the Federal Funds rate on the liquidity premium, which is
measured by the yield spread between Aaa-rated corporate bond and the long term Treasury
bond. Specifically, Regressions (1) to (3) look at the impact of money growth with bond sup-
ply on the liquidity premiumwhich the long-term Treasuries carry. In particular, Regression (2)
16Notice that there are two indexes which represents the opportunity cost of holding money meant by the the-
ory: money growth rate and nominal interest rates. Even though they are theoretically equivalent by the Fisher
equation and the definition of the stationary equilibrium, I will show that there can be cases where only one of
them significantly affect long or short term liquidity premia in the data. In fact, Nagel (2014) only presents the
cases where the Federal Funds rate has a positive effect on the liquidity premia, which are measuredmonthly only
by some short term bonds. However, here I show the liquidity premia are also affected by money growth. and
also how it is robust to the liquidity premium of the long term bond such as the long term Treasuries.
17See Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) for the details about why this measure can be a proxy for
default risk. In short, they argues that this measure have a high correlation with another default risk measure such
as the median expected default frequency credit measure fromMoody’s Analytics.
18See Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) for details. According to them, “there have never been a
default on high-grade CP.” Also, they use the spread of Aaa-rated bonds against Treasuries to estimate the market
value of the liquidity convenience, assuming that the default risk of the Aaa-rated bonds is low.
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and (3) test whether Treasury bonds are substitutes with money or not. The theory predicts that
if they are not substitutes, money growth does not affect the liquidity premium of Treasuries
at all, because the money-traded market are totally separate from the bond-collaterlized mar-
ket. However, the regression results deliver that money growth has a significant and positive
impact on the liquidity premium. Also, bond supply is negatively correlated with the liquidity
premium. An increase in bond supply reduces its market price for the liquidity services which
the bonds provide. All of these results imply that Treasury bonds are substantive substitutes
with money to some degree in that they provide liquidity services like money does. The nega-
tive effect of bond supply is consistent with Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) even
without the log specification19, and also is robust to default risk. A control variable for de-
fault risk is included as an explanatory variable in Regression (3), and the coefficients of money
growth and bond supply are still significant. This implies that changes in the spread, or the
liquidity premium, are significantly affected by both of them even if money and bonds are not
perfectly substitutes. The coefficient of the risk premium control variable is also significant. On
the other hand, Regression (4) to (6) show the impact of the Federal Funds rate on the liquidity
premium. Unlike money supply, its impact on the liquidity premium is not significant in the
regressions with bond supply.
Next, Table 2 uses different measures of the liquidity premia: the yield spread of AA-rated
Commercial Papers, and FDIC CDs against Treasury Bills, and the TED spread. All the regres-
sions present that the impact of money growth is significantly positive and is robust with bond
supply and default risk controls. Also, these results strongly support the theoretical predic-
tion that Treasury Bills are substitutes with money like Treasury bonds, again.20 Notice that
19They use the log specification in their regressions because it provides a good fit and there is only one parameter
they are interested in.
20The regressions with the quarterly data over the same period present the similar result. See Appendix B for
the regression results.
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Table 1: Impact of money growth on Aaa Cor. - Treasury Bond Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1946-2008 1946-2008 1946-2008 1955-2008 1955-2008 1955-2008
NM Growth 1.648** 0.917*** 0.557***
(0.735) (0.244) (0.160)
Debt to GDP -1.496*** -1.326*** -3.795*** -3.188***
(0.421) (0.295) (0.710) (0.745)
Volatility 4.495*** 3.484***
(0.893) (0.903)
Federal funds rate 0.0564*** 0.000219 -0.00253
(0.0147) (0.0162) (0.0152)
Constant 0.654*** 1.348*** 0.690*** 0.509*** 2.258*** 1.567***
(0.0833) (0.205) (0.211) (0.120) (0.366) (0.434)
Observations 63 63 63 54 54 54
Adjusted R-squared 0.092 0.417 0.610 0.166 0.542 0.661
Notes: Coefficients are estimated by Newey-West estimators with lag(1) and its standard errors are
presented in parenthesis. The dependent variables are the yield spreads between private and Trea-
sury bonds, which are measured in a percentage unit. Explanatory variables are the growth rate of
NarrowMoney and the ratio of the market value of Treasury debt outstanding to nominal GDP. A
control variable for the default risk on private assets is V olatility, which is measured by annual-
ized standard deviation of weekly log stock returns on the S&P 500 index (Source: Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Regressions (5) to (7) do not include a control variable for default risk because the FDIC CDs
as an illiquid financial security are as safe as Treasuries, and so its spread with Treasuries only
reflects the difference between liquidity services which they provides.
Regressions (4), (7), and (11) present whether Federal Funds rate affects the liquidity pre-
mium in the case where bonds are substitutes with money as in Regressions (3), (6) and (10).
The Federal Funds rate as a proxy of the nominal interest rate is equivalent theoretically to the
money growth, because both of them stand for the opportunity cost of holding money. In Re-
gression (4) and (11), the Federal Funds rate has a significantly positive impact on the liquidity
premia, which is measured by the yield spread between AA CPs and Treasury Bills, and the
TED spread, whereas it does not in Regression (7). Also, bond supply still has a significant and
strong negative effect on the liquidity premium.21
To summarize, money growth has a significant and positive impact on the liquidity premia,
and also the nominal interest rate has a positive effect on it in some regressions. Even if money
growth and the nominal interest rate are theoretically equivalent because both changes in both
variables mean changes in the opportunity cost of holding money, they cannot be not in the
21In fact, this is different from the results which Nagel (2014) delivers. The paper argues that there is no impact
of the bond supply on the liquidity premium. However, it does not look at the measures of the liquidity premium
which are used here: the AAA cor. - Treasury bond spread, and the 6-month FDIC CDs - Treasury Bill spread.
even though they also reflect the liquidity premia.
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data. For example, this difference may come from the fact that short and long term bonds are
traded in different institutions, by different agents, or different regulations, even though they
are similar in terms of liquidity. However, notice that this does not change the economic mech-
anism of how money or nominal interest rates affect the liquidity premia which liquid bonds
carry in the financial market. All the results provide strong support the theoretical predictions:
bond prices bear the liquidity premium, bonds are substantive substitutes with money even if
not perfect, and the money holding cost is a primary factor in the mechanismwhich deliver the
aforementioned results.
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Table 2: Impact of money growth on the spreads (Yearly)
Variables AA CP - T-Bills FDIC CDs - T-Bills TED spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1946-2008 1946-2008 1946-2008 1955-2008 1984-2008 1984-2008 1984-2008 1986-2008 1986-2008 1986-2008 1986-2008
NM Growth 1.681*** 1.256*** 1.168*** 2.378*** 2.535*** 1.341*** 1.343*** 1.209***
(0.543) (0.247) (0.298) (0.249) (0.231) (0.194) (0.187) (0.224)
Debt to GDP -0.871* -0.829* -0.564 -5.471*** -5.074*** -0.0543 0.980 0.212
(0.471) (0.430) (1.037) (1.584) (1.777) (1.535) (1.665) (1.127)
Volatility 1.097 0.271 2.010 1.608
(1.722) (1.344) (1.464) (1.521)
Federal Funds Rate 0.0947*** 0.0366 0.0923*
(0.0323) (0.0463) (0.0468)
Constant 0.586*** 0.990*** 0.829*** 0.362 -0.0569 2.151*** 2.026** 0.565*** 0.588 -0.120 -0.0824
(0.0784) (0.272) (0.254) (0.435) (0.134) (0.633) (0.785) (0.107) (0.668) (0.808) (0.447)
Observations 63 63 63 54 25 25 25 23 23 23 23
Adjusted R-squared 0.037 0.076 0.066 0.210 0.272 0.551 0.206 0.180 0.139 0.147 0.233
Notes: Coefficients are estimated by Newey-West estimators with lag(1) and its standard errors are presented in parenthesis. The dependent variables are the yield
spreads between private and Treasury bonds, which are measured in a percentage unit. Explanatory variables are the growth rate of Narrow Money and the ratio of
the market value of Treasury debt outstanding to nominal GDP. A control variable for the default risk on private assets is V olatility, which is measured by annualized
standard deviation of weekly log stock returns on the S&P 500 index (Source: Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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4 Discussion on Negative Interest Rates
Negative interest rates have been observed in some countries such as the United States, Switzer-
land, Japan and Germany, in particular, for the recent years after 2008. For example, in Switzer-
land, the yields of almost all the government bonds have been negative after 2008. In addition,
the yield of 3 month Treasury Bills in the United States had been negative during several days
in September, 2015, even if the federal fund rates were slightly positive.
The negative yields, or interest rates imply that lenders pay borrowers interests on their bor-
rowings. It wouldn’t make sense if interest rates were considered as the risk premium which
is compensated for borrowers’ default risk, because it is the lenders that take the default risk
of the loans. Since cash is unambiguously as safe as any other government bonds, the lenders
could hoard physical cash in their safes, whose interest rate is 0%, i.e., can never be negative.
Then, why have we observed the negative interest rates in reality? Or, why do not investors in
the financial market choose to hold cash, instead of the government bonds?
First, consider a financial market where investors are always willing to pay for the liquidity
service the governments bonds provide. For example, in some financial markets such as Re-
purchase Agreement markets and the collateralized federal funds market, liquid bonds such
as the government bonds are necessary as collateral in transactions. Theoretically, this can be
regarded as the case where the value of 1 − θ in the model is not small. As shown before, the
yield of a liquid bond from the model is given by
ρ =
(1− g)
[
1+µ
β
− 1
]
− (1− θ)h [u′(za)− 1]
(1− g) + g 1+µ
β
+ (1− θ)h [u′(za)− 1]
(24)
=
(1− g)i− (1− θ)h [u′(za)− 1]
1 + gi+ (1− θ)h [u′(za)− 1]
. (25)
The theory predicts that there is a high chance that the negative yield would emerge, in partic-
ular, when bond supply decreases, and the nominal interest rate is low: money is not in short.
This is because the liquidity services which liquid bonds provide are valued high relatively
when the money holding cost is low. It implies that the bond buyers would be willing to accept
the negative yields of the bonds to hold them in their portfolios for transactions. In fact, it is
supported by the comments from the market participants during the periods of the low nomi-
nal interest rate. For example, according to Bloomberg (September 25, 2015), Kenneth Silliman,
head of U.S. short-term rates trading in New York at TD Securities unit, one of 22 primary deal-
ers that trade with the Fed said,
“Yields on U.S. Treasury bills fell below zero as an influx of cash and pent-up appetite for safe as-
sets led investors to accept negative returns after the Federal Reserve decided not to raise its short-term
interest rate. ...... Investors will have additional funds totaling about $100 billion returned to them in
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the next month as the government cuts bill supply heading into negotiations with Congress about the
statutory debt limit”, 2223
To summarize in brief, this article says that the main factors which drove down the negative
interest rate below zero were ‘an influx of cash and a cut in bill supply.’ Also, remember that
the policy rate of the Fed, has been hovering around zero for more than 7 years since 2008. In
other words, when the negative interest rate occurred, the money holding cost was low, and
also the bill supply was expected to decrease. However, there have existed strong demand on
the government bonds. Both factors were at work together in the direction to raise up the liq-
uidity premium of liquid bonds such as Treasury bills, so that the interest rate seemed to fall
down to the negative territory.
Interestingly, this negative yield can also be explained by ‘an influx of cash’ in addition to
‘a cut in bill supply’. As shown theoretically and empirically in the previous sections, money
supply (or growth) increases the liquidity premium, whereas bond supply decreases it. Hence,
with a slight abuse of the theory, this fall of the yield to the negative territory can be interpreted
as an increase in the liquidity premium which the government bonds bear.
Moreover, we can find another example which the theory can be applied to in Switzerland.
As shown in Figure 8, the negative yields on government bonds have been observed for a sub-
stantial period of time since 2008. Also, it looks at how money and the government bond sup-
ply have been evolving. The ratio of the government bond supply relative to GDP shrank from
around 50% to around 30%, whereas the money supply, measured by M124, relatively increased
more than twice during the same period. If we apply the empirical result to this example, it
is highly likely that the relative scarcity of the liquid government bonds against money in the
market have led to an increase in the high liquidity premia on the government bonds. More-
over, the interest target range of the Swiss National Bank was 0-1.00% at then end of 200825,
and, after then, continued to decrease, and fell into the negative target. Accordingly, it can be
inferred that the main factor for the negative interest rates is the high liquidity premia on the
liquid government bonds due to their short supply.26
22Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-17/treasury-bill-yields-turn-negative-as-fed-
leaves-rates-unchanged
23See the following comment in The Wall Street Journal (Sept 23, 2014) for another example: “Short-term debt
trading at negative yields was essentially unheard of before the 2008 financial crisis. But since then, the condition
has cropped up at times of market stress, reflecting extraordinarily expansive central-bank policy and anemic
growth in much of the world. Yields on some U.S. bills traded below zero at the end of each of the past three years
amid strong demand for liquid assets, according to analysts.” Source: http://www.wsj.com/articles/treasury-
bill-yield-tips-into-negative-territory-1411516748
24It includes currency in circulation, sight deposits and deposits in transaction accounts.
25It is fixed at 0 - 1.00% on 12/11/2008, 0 - 0.75% on 3/12/2009, 0 - 0.25% on 8/3/2011, -0.75 - 0.25% on
12/18/2014, and -1.25 - -0.25% on 1/15/2015.
26Also, according to Aleks Berentsen, Swiss government bonds can be used as collateral in somemarkets outside
of Switzerland but where the Swiss franc cannot. It implies Swiss government bonds have higher (1 − θ), so that
there are higher possibility that their yields would be negative in the case where liquid bonds are scarce.
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Figure 8: Interest Rates, Money and Gov’t Bond Supply in Switzerland
5 Conclusion
This paper explores the effects of money and bond supply on the liquidity premia in the prices
of liquid financial assets such as government bonds. The theory delivers elaborate predictions
about under which conditions money supply can affect the liquidity premia. For example,
it has a positive impact on them by changing the opportunity cost of holding money and so
affecting the demand on liquid bonds only when liquid bonds are substitutes with money, even
if partial. Moreover, if they are perfectly substitutes, the negative yields on liquid bonds can
appear in the equilibrium. On the other hand, the bond supply also directly affects the liquidity
premia by changing relative scarcity of the bonds. Lastly, the empirical analysis presents a
strong support for the theoretical findings. The US data display that money supply as a proxy
of themoney holding cost has a positive impact on the liquidity premium, whereas bond supply
has a negative impact. Also, it describes how the liquidity premia are associated with negative
nominal yield on liquid bonds which were observed in the US and Switzerland.
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A Appendix
Proof. Proof of Lemmas 1 and 2.
First, consider Lemma 1. Substituting φtpt into the objective function in Equation 6 re-
express the bargaining problem as
max
q
{u(q)− q}
subject to q = φp, and p ≤ w˜t. If φw˜t ≥ q
∗, the optimal choice of q will be the first best quantity
q∗, i.e., q = q∗. Then, p = (pm, pa) such that φpm + gpa = q∗. However, if φw˜t < q
∗, the effective
budget constraint is binding. Accordingly, the buyer will give up all her real balances in order
to purchase as many as possible. Then, the optimal choice of q will be the same as her real
balances φw˜t. Also, p = (m, a). When it comes to Lemma 2, the same steps above can be taken
for proof. Since it is straightforward, it is omitted.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 3
First, consider whether the real balances are as a direct medium of exchange or as collateral
to borrow credit enough to obtain the optimal quantity q∗ in each of the two DM markets.
If z˜ ≥ q∗ or z˜a ≥ q∗, q1 = q∗ or q2 = q∗; otherwise, q1 = z˜ or q2 = z˜a by lemmas 1 or 2.
Then, plugging these result into the first order conditions (??) and (??) for the maximum of
the objective function will yield the equilibrium prices φ and ψ. Also, the marginal utility
function u′ is monotonically decreasing in its argument, so that the equilibrium is uniquely
determined.
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B Impact of money growth on the liquidity premium: Quarterly Data
Table 3: Impact of money growth on the liquidity premium (Quarterly, 1946Q1-2008Q4)
Variables AAA Cor. - Treasury Bond AA CP - T-Bills TED Spread
(1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES 1946Q1-20008Q4 cpbill1 cpbill1 tedspread tedspread tedspread
NM Growth 3.060*** 2.353*** 1.144*** 1.740*** 3.116*** 3.863***
(0.999) (0.222) (0.170) (0.230) (0.211) (0.353)
Dept to GDP -1.708*** -1.969*** -1.742*** -0.0345 -2.940*** -0.0337
(0.250) (0.367) (0.418) (0.308) (0.922) (1.321)
Federal Funds Rate -0.0235* 0.0926*** 0.0914***
(0.0136) (0.0122) (0.0193)
Constant 0.709*** 1.716*** 2.038*** 0.587*** 1.424*** 0.0312 0.616*** 2.314*** 0.264
(0.0406) (0.135) (0.254) (0.0538) (0.236) (0.185) (0.0565) (0.539) (0.731)
Observations 252 172 172 151 151 151 92 92 92
Adjusted R-squared 0.064 0.320 0.276 0.005 0.209 0.422 0.184 0.329 0.201
Notes: Coefficients are estimated by Newey-West estimators with lag(1) and its standard errors are presented in parenthesis. The dependent
variables are the yield spreads between private financial assets and Treasuries. They are measured in a percentage unit. Explanatory variables
are the growth rate of Narrow Money and the ratio of the market value of Treasury debt outstanding to nominal GDP. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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